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Abstract - In this reply, I argue that Addison and Teixeira’s rejoinder to my study is character-
istically misleading and erroneous. While the authors agree that my investigation is interesting 
in its own right, they doubt that my findings indicate misspecification. But they ignore almost 
all of the German studies on employment growth. While Addison and Teixeira admit several 
serious mistakes in their tables, they do a poor job in comparing their paper with my study. 
Basically, they compare apples with oranges. Addison and Teixeira complain that I do not 
appreciate the overall contribution of their analysis. Yet, this simply distracts from the funda-
mental issue. Finally, the authors come up with personal allegations and attacks that are far 
away from good scientific style. In their attempt to discredit my study, Addison and Teixeira 
do even not provide correct citations of what I wrote. 
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Definitionen basieren. Der Vorwurf, ich würde ihr Gesamtwerk nicht würdigen, lenkt nur vom 
Hauptproblem ab. Addison und Teixeiras Erwiderung ist durch heftige persönliche Angriffe 
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1.  Introduction 
In my study on works councils and employment growth (Jirjahn 2008a), I find that the 
estimated growth effect of workplace codetermination depends on the specification of 
establishment size. The results show no influence of establishment size but a negative 
effect of works councils when establishment size enters linearly in the growth regres-
sion. Yet, the estimates confirm a negative influence of establishment size and no 
significant effect of workplace codetermination when the logarithm of establishment 
size is included. These findings support the hypothesis that a misspecification of es-
tablishment size can yield biased estimates of the growth effects of works councils. 
This follows from two empirical regularities. First, establishment size and the presence 
of a works council are positively correlated. Second, several international and German 
studies show that larger establishments exhibit lower growth rates. Hence, if estab-
lishment size is not correctly specified in the growth regression, the estimated coeffi-
cient on workplace codetermination is very likely to reflect the negative relationship 
between size and growth. 
In what follows, I will argue that Addison and Teixeira’s (2008) rejoinder to my 
study is characteristically misleading and erroneous. First, while Addison and Teixeira 
(2008) agree that my study is of interest in its own right, they doubt that my results 
provide evidence of a misspecification error. They claim that the German experience 
does not indicate a negative relationship between establishment size and employment 
growth. Yet, Addison and Teixeira (2008) ignore almost all of the German studies on 
this issue. Those studies are in line with international evidence and confirm a negative 
association between size and growth also for Germany. Moreover, in this reply, I now 
also show that – based on the Akaike information criterion – the regression model 
with the logarithmic specification of establishment size indeed has to be preferred 
over a model with a linear specification. This underscores that I find a negative 
growth effect of works councils only in the inferior but not in the superior regression 
model.
Second, Addison and Teixeira (2008) admit several serious mistakes in the tables 
presented in their earlier paper on works councils and employment change (Addison/ 
Teixeira 2006). These mistakes refer to some erroneous information on the number of 
observations and the time period examined. Most importantly, they now claim that 
they provided false information on their specification of establishment size. They 
claim that they have simply forgotten to mention that they used a logarithmic specifi-
cation and not a linear specification. The surprised reader is left with the question of 
how to reconcile our conflicting results. In light of Addison and Teixeira’s claim, their 
former paper does not only imply a negative growth effect of works councils but also 
a positive growth effect of logarithmic establishment size. While the authors correctly 
point to different sample sizes, they do a poor job in comparing their paper with my 
study. Indeed, a sound comparison appears to be difficult as the authors provide al-
most no descriptive statistics in their former paper and do not eliminate this short-
coming in their rejoinder. However, there is one exception. Addison and Teixeira 
(2006) present descriptive statistics on a single growth rate. In the rejoinder, the au-
thors contrast these descriptive statistics with the descriptive statistics presented in my 
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study. Yet, they compare apples with oranges as they compare growth rates based on 
different definitions. Obviously, Addison and Teixeira continue to make mistakes 
even in their rejoinder. 
Third, Addison and Teixeira (2008) fail to recognize that their positive growth ef-
fect of establishment size is sharply at odds with the extant literature. Even if the au-
thors believe in Gibrat’s law, this does not imply that they can produce any arbitrary 
result. They cannot justify their arbitrary result by simply claiming that they do not 
provide an appropriate test of Gibrat’s law. Hence, the basic problem still exists. To 
the extent establishment size is correlated with works council incidence, doubts on 
Addison and Teixeira’s positive growth effect of establishment size carry over to their 
estimated growth effect of workplace codetermination. 
Fourth, the authors complain that I do not appreciate the overall contribution of 
their former paper. They argue that the paper was motivated by the “virtual absence 
of any comprehensive German study on the works council-employment nexus other 
than (disputation as to their implications for) labor turnover.” At this point it may be 
mentioned that the paper is not that innovative as the authors let us believe. There are 
several studies on employment growth in Germany that also take into account the 
effect of works councils. These studies are basically ignored by the authors. Addison 
and Teixeira may be the first who attempt to examine the role of a potential survivor 
bias and to investigate the effect of works councils on the pace of employment ad-
justment. Yet, while these issues are interesting in their own right, they simply do not 
address the basic point of my study. In that study, I focus on a specific and most 
problematic issue, namely the estimated growth effect of works councils. This is abso-
lutely legitimate. Large parts of their rejoinder completely miss the point. Instead of 
discussing or defending their negative growth effect of workplace codetermination in 
more detail, they summarize parts of their analysis that are (at least for the moment) 
not under discussion. This distracts from the basic problem and obscures the authors’ 
mistakes. However, reinvestigating the other parts of their earlier paper stands as fu-
ture research. Just to provide an example, Addison and Teixeira (2006) do not only 
find little evidence of a survivor bias but also that works councils have no significant 
effect on establishment closures. The latter finding is sharply at odds with a previous 
study by Addison, Bellmann and Kölling (2004) showing that councils are associated 
with an increased probability of closure. Even though they cite this study, Addison 
and Teixeira make not the slightest attempt to reconcile the conflicting results. 
Fifth, instead of apologizing for their mistakes and providing reasonable argu-
ments to reconcile their paper with my study, the authors come up with personal at-
tacks mixed with a strategy to distract from the shortcomings of their paper. Such 
argumenta ad hominem are far away from good scientific style. In their keen attempt 
to discredit my study, Addison and Teixeira (2008) are even not able to provide cor-
rect citations of what I wrote. 
In contrast to Addison and Teixeira, I will try to distinguish between scientific ar-
guments and personal notes for most parts of my reply. Even though it is tempting to 
adopt their rhetorical and nebulous style of writing, I will try to focus on sound scien-
tific reasoning. However, in the concluding section I will also make some personal 
notes to the authors. Addison and Teixeira end their rejoinder with a useful reminder. 
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I am so indebted for those profound thoughts that I feel obliged to reciprocate with 
some useful recommendations. 
2.  A summary of key results 
As my paper on works councils and employment growth (Jirjahn 2008a) is written in 
German, I provide an English summary of my key results to inform the international 
readership. Like Addison and Teixeira (2006), I also use the IAB Establishment Panel 
to examine the relationship between works councils and employment growth in West 
German establishments. I also follow the authors in regressing employment growth 
between 1993 and 2001 on establishment characteristics in 1993. However, our sets of 
control variables only partially overlap. While I exclude some of Addison and 
Teixeira’s insignificant variables, I include a couple of other control variables that are 
not considered by the authors but are relevant determinants of employment growth. 
In my study, I use two different growth rates. The first growth rate is: 
))1993()2001((5.0
)1993()2001(
1
EmploymentEmployment
EmploymentEmployment
RateGrowth
??
?? . (1) 
Changes in employment are divided by the average of employment (Davis and Halti-
wanger 1992). Using this growth rate may reduce the impact of outliers. A second 
definition often found in the literature uses logs (e.g., Evans 1987). That growth rate 
is:
))1993(ln())2001(ln(2 EmploymentEmploymentRateGrowth ?? . (2) 
To address Addison and Teixeira’s rejoinder, I will also consider the standard growth 
rate in this reply: 
)1993(
)1993()2001(
3
Employment
EmploymentEmployment
RateGrowth
?? . (3) 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the three growth rates. The initial estimates 
are shown in Table 2.  
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
All Establishments (N = 906) 
Variable Mean, Std. Dev. 
Growth Rate 1 -0.1498, 0.4610 
Growth Rate 2 -0.1820, 0.6132 
Growth Rate 3 -0.0495, 0.4651 
Only Establishments without Changes in Works Council Status;  
Without Agriculture and Forestry, Hunting and Fishing, Banking and Insurance (N = 652) 
Variable Mean, Std. Dev. 
Growth Rate 1 -0.1537, 0.4483 
Growth Rate 2 -0.1801, 0.5653 
Growth Rate 3 -0.0583, 0.4440 
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Table 2:  Determinants of employment growth; all establishments 
Dependent Variable 
Explanatory Variable 
Growth Rate 1 Growth Rate 2 Growth Rate 3 
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Presence of a  
Works Council 
-0.1075 
(2.69)*** 
-0.0465 
(0.94) 
-0.1299 
(2.60)** 
-0.0483 
(0.75) 
-0.1305 
(3.43)*** 
-0.0607 
(1.30) 
Number of  
Employees
8.21e-07 
(0.28) 
- - - 
-9.87e-08 
(0.02) 
- - - 
-2.13e-06 
(0.82) 
- - - 
Log(Number of 
Employees)
- - - 
-0.0348 
(2.29)** 
- - - 
-0.0465 
(2.19)** 
- - - 
-0.0396 
(2.73)*** 
R2 0.1158 0.1218 0.0944 0.1006 0.1055 0.1131 
AIC 1115.62 1109.36 1654.15 1647.96 1141.89 1134.11 
N 906 906 906 906 906 906 
Method: OLS. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***: ? = 0.01; **: ? = 0.05. All regressions include variables for short-time 
work, overtime work, shift work, work on Saturdays, legal form, vintage of production technology, share of apprentices, share 
of skilled blue-collar workers, share of unskilled blue-collar workers, industry affiliation and federal states. 
For each growth rate, the results of two regression models are reported. Model A in-
cludes linear establishment size (number of employees in 1993) as explanatory variable 
while Model B is based on a logarithmic specification of establishment size. A dummy 
variable for the presence of a works council is included in all regressions. Control 
variables for short-time work, overtime work, shift work, work on Saturdays, legal 
form, vintage of production technology, workforce structure, industry affiliation and 
federal states are also included in each estimation. The results on the control variables 
are suppressed to save space. 
The estimates show a clear pattern of results. When establishment size enters 
linearly in the growth regression, it is no significant determinant of employment 
growth while the negative coefficient on works council incidence is statistically signifi-
cant. The results change dramatically when the logarithm of establishment size is in-
cluded. The results now confirm a significantly negative growth effect of establish-
ment size whereas workplace codetermination is no longer a statistically significant 
covariate of employment growth. This pattern of results supports the hypothesis 
that a misspecification of establishment size can yield biased estimates of the growth 
effects of workplace codetermination. This hypothesis is based on two regularities. 
First, establishment size and the presence of a works council are positively corre-
lated. Second, there is substantial evidence of a negative relationship between estab-
lishment size and employment growth. Thus, if establishment size is not correctly 
specified in the growth regression, the estimated coefficient on works council inci-
dence is very likely to pick up the negative growth effect of establishment size. 
In this reply, I additionally present the Akaike information criterion (AIC) that 
helps to select between nonnested regression models.1 As shown in Table 2, Model B
                                                          
1 In our case the number of parameters is the same in the two models. Hence, the Akaike 
information criterion implies that the choice between Model A and Model B simply comes 
down to choosing the model with the higher log-likelihood function. 
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has always a smaller AIC than Model A. The regression model with the logarithmic 
specification of establishment size has to be preferred over the model with the linear 
specification. Hence, I find the negative relationship between size and growth in the 
superior but not in the inferior regression model while I find a negative growth effect 
of workplace codetermination not in the superior but only in the inferior model. This 
can be seen as additional support for my hypothesis. 
In this reply, I provide a further check of robustness. I follow Addison and 
Teixeira (2006) and exclude agriculture and forestry, hunting and fishing, and banking 
and insurance from the analysis.2 I also exclude establishments with a change in their 
works council status. As can be seen in Table 3, this exercise does not change the 
basic pattern of results. 
Table 3: Determinants of employment growth; only establishments without changes 
in works council status; without agriculture and forestry, hunting and fish-
ing, banking and insurance 
Dependent Variable 
Explanatory Variable 
Growth Rate 1 Growth Rate 2 Growth Rate 3 
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Presence of a  
Works Council 
-0.0902 
(1.87)* 
-0.0077 
(0.12) 
-0.1121 
(1.76)* 
-0.0165 
(0.19) 
-0.1124 
(2.64)*** 
-0.0328 
(0.67) 
Number of  
Employees
-6.21e-07 
(0.17) 
- - - 
3.18e-07 
(0.02) 
- - - 
-2.84e-06 
(0.91) 
- - - 
Log(Number of 
Employees)
- - - 
-0.0387 
(2.17)** 
- - - 
-0.0449 
(1.96)* 
- - - 
-0.0373 
(2.36)** 
R2 0.1357 0.1427 0.1171 0.1230 0.1471 0.1535 
AIC 764.11 758.80 1080.27 1075.87 742.66 737.75 
N 652 652 652 652 652 652 
Method: OLS. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***: ? = 0.01; **: ? = 0.05; *: ? = 0.1. All regressions include variables for 
short-time work, overtime work, shift work, work on Saturdays, legal form, vintage of production technology, share of appren-
tices, share of skilled blue-collar workers, share of unskilled blue-collar workers, industry affiliation and federal states. 
3.  Establishment size and employment growth 
The interpretation of my findings is based on the assumption that there exists indeed 
a negative relationship between establishment size and employment growth. Several 
international studies confirm such a negative relationship (e.g., Evans 1987 for the US; 
Dunne/Hughes 1994 for Britain; Blanchflower/Burgess 1998 for Australia; Weiss 
1998 for Austria; Audretsch/Santarelli/Vivarelli 1999 for Italy). Acs and Audretsch 
(1990) go so far to contend that the negative relationship between size and growth is a 
“stylized fact.” 
Addison and Teixeira (2008) claim that the negative association between size and 
employment growth does not hold true for Germany. Hence, they reject the interpre-
tation that my findings indicate problems of misspecification. They conclude that “the 
                                                          
2 In Jirjahn (2008a), I already mention in footnote 2 that excluding those sectors does not 
change the basic pattern of results. 
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admittedly sparse German literature if anything might suggest that firm growth rates are 
independent of firm size.” The authors cite only two papers to support their view. 
The first paper is a very early econometric attempt by Wagner (1992) to investigate the 
link between size and employment growth in Germany.3 The second paper provides 
only descriptive statistics (Wagner/Koller/Schnabel 2008). This is a remarkably selec-
tive and misleading review of the extant literature. The German literature is not nearly 
as sparse as the authors would have us believe. Addison and Teixeira completely ig-
nore recent econometric studies showing a negative relationship between size and 
employment growth also for Germany. Harhoff and Stahl (1995), Harhoff, Stahl and 
Woywode (1998), Gerlach and Jirjahn (1999), and Almus and Nerlinger (1999, 2000) 
provide evidence of a negative relationship for West Germany. Harhoff and Stahl 
(1994), Hinz, Wilsdorf and Ziegler (1997), and Steil and Wolf (1999) provide evidence 
for East Germany. 
4.  How to keep readers guessing 
In their rejoinder, Addison and Teixeira admit several serious mistakes in the tables 
presented in their own paper on works councils and employment change. In Table A1 
and Table A2, Addison and Teixeira (2006) show the results of regressions that addi-
tionally control for collective bargaining agreements and the interaction of works 
councils with collective bargaining agreements. The titles of the tables and the number 
of observations suggest that the authors here also regress the employment change 
between 1993 and 2001 on establishment characteristics in 1993. Yet, this is amazing. 
In Jirjahn (2008a), I point out that the 1993 wave of the IAB Establishment Panel 
does not contain any information whether the establishment is covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement. There is only information whether there is a collective contract 
in the industry. Using this information does not make any sense as establishments are 
only covered if they are members of an employer’s association or the firm directly 
negotiates with the union. The surprised reader now experiences that the information 
given in the tables is wrong. Addison and Teixeira (2008) claim that the sample period 
in question is 1995-2001 and that the numbers of observations shown in both tables 
are also not correct. 
Most importantly, Addison and Teixeira (2008) admit that they provided false in-
formation on their specification of establishment size. In their paper on works coun-
cils and employment change, Addison and Teixeira (2006) present a linear specifica-
tion. They now claim that they have simply forgotten to mention that their results are 
based on a logarithmic specification of establishment size and not on the linear speci-
fication. They call this “an error of omission on our side that escaped identification in 
the proof-reading stage.” This comes really as a surprise. On March 13th, I sent an 
email to the authors and asked them to send me their do files. On August 1st, more 
than four months later, I received a long email from Teixeira.4 While he summarized 
several steps to assemble the dataset, he also wrote that he did not keep record of any 
                                                          
3 Addison and Teixeira might have wished to cite another early study by Schmidt (1995). 
This study also finds no systematic relationship. 
4 At that time, I had finished my own study. 
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of the files. But of course, even though their do files are not available, it is well possi-
ble that the authors at least still have their log files. And these log files might have 
revealed the authors’ true specification. 
So given the error of omission, the results of Addison and Teixeira (2006) do not 
only imply a negative employment growth effect of workplace codetermination but 
also a positive employment growth effect of logarithmic establishment size. This obvi-
ously raises the question of how to reconcile our conflicting findings. While Addison 
and Teixeira (2008) correctly point to different sample sizes, they do a poor job in 
comparing their paper with my study. The authors provide almost no descriptive sta-
tistics in their earlier paper and do not eliminate this shortcoming in their rejoinder. 
Yet, providing a table with descriptive statistics and clear variable definitions is a 
minimum standard every empirical study should meet. This would be particularly 
helpful in our case. While our sets of control variables do not perfectly coincide, there 
are several variables used in both studies. These variables could form the basis for a 
sound comparison. If the authors still have their log files, they might also still have 
some descriptive statistics for their regression sample. 
However, in Table 1 of their paper, Addison and Teixeira (2006) present descrip-
tive statistics on a single growth rate. In their rejoinder, they contrast these descriptive 
statistics with the descriptive statistics on a growth rate presented in Table 1 of my 
study (Jirjahn 2008a). This aims to demonstrate that the compositions of our samples 
markedly differ. Addison and Teixeira (2008) conclude that they “are not necessarily 
surprised that Jirjahn comes up with different results for the principal variable of in-
terest.” Yet, their comparison fails for two reasons. First, the sample for their descrip-
tive statistics is obviously not identical with their regression sample (n = 786 vs. n = 
600). Hence, their descriptive statistics are not necessarily helpful in comparing our 
different regression samples. Second and most importantly, Addison and Teixeira 
compare apples with oranges. They compare their descriptive statistics on the stan-
dard growth rate (Growth Rate 3) with my descriptive statistics on a growth rate 
measured as the difference in log employment (Growth Rate 2). Note that Addison 
and Teixeira call their comparison housekeeping. I must admit that I am frightened by 
such housekeeping. To provide a sound comparison, Table 1 of this reply presents 
also descriptive statistics on the standard growth rate. As can be seen, the average 
growth rates are very similar: -5.5% for Addison and Teixeira and -5% (-5.8% in the 
restricted sample) for Jirjahn. 
Moreover, Addison and Teixeira (2008) fail to recognize that their positive growth 
effect of establishment size is sharply at odds with the extant literature. Even if the 
authors believe in Gibrat’s law, this does not imply that they can produce any arbitrary 
result. They cannot justify an arbitrary result by simply claiming that they do not pro-
vide an appropriate test of Gibrat’s law. Hence, the basic problem persists. To the 
extent establishment size is correlated with works council incidence, doubts on Addi-
son and Teixeira’s positive growth effect of establishment size carry over to their esti-
mated growth effect of workplace codetermination. 
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5.  The distraction 
Addison and Teixeira complain that I do not appreciate their overall contribution. 
Yet, this complaint simply misses the point. I focus on a specific and most problem-
atic issue, namely the estimated growth effect of works councils. This is absolutely 
legitimate. Their complaint just distracts from the basic point and obscures the short-
comings of their paper. The authors motivate their paper by a virtual absence of any 
comprehensive study on works councils and employment. At this point, it may be 
mentioned that the paper is not as innovative as the authors would have us believe. 
For example, Gold (1999), Gerlach and Jirjahn (1999), and Meyer and Pfeifer (2005) 
also consider the role of works councils in employment growth. It might have been 
very fruitful, if the authors – at least in the rejoinder – would have compared their 
paper with those studies. Yet, the studies are basically ignored. Addison and Teixeira 
(2006) may be the first who attempt to examine the potential role of a survivor bias 
and the effect of works councils on the pace of employment adjustment.5 They find 
little evidence of a survivor bias and also no evidence that works councils influence 
the pace of employment adjustment. While these issues are interesting in their own 
right, they do not address the point of my study. In their discussion, Addison and 
Teixeira (2008) provide a lengthy summary of their overall contribution. Yet, this is 
completely unrelated to my study. 
While large parts of the rejoinder are simply distracting, a sound discussion of the 
overall contribution might have been very fruitful. The focus of such a discussion 
might have been on the question of whether their paper provides a coherent pattern 
of results. Is it plausible that works councils have a negative impact on employment 
growth but no influence on the pace of employment adjustment? If it is not plausible, 
what are the implications? If the authors believe in the negative growth effect of 
works councils, does it make sense that there is no influence on the pace of employ-
ment adjustment? Or to put it another way, if the authors believe in the lack of effect 
on the pace of employment adjustment, does it make sense that they obtain a negative 
effect on employment growth? Some theoretical considerations to answer these ques-
tions would have been very useful. 
Moreover, it would have been helpful if the authors would have put their results 
in the context of the wider works council literature. Several studies indicate that works 
councils neither inhibit investment nor innovation (Addison/Schnabel/Wagner 2001, 
Dilger 2002, Hübler 2003, Blume/Gerstlberger 2007). Quite the contrary, there is 
evidence that works councils are positively associated with specific types of invest-
ments and innovations (Jirjahn 2005, 2006 for a survey). Is a negative employment 
growth effect of workplace codetermination compatible with a nonnegative effect on 
investment and innovation? Some considerations to answer this question would have 
been nice. 
                                                          
5 But note that the survivor bias has been already examined by several German studies that 
do not control for works council incidence (e.g., Harhoff/Stahl 1995; Harhoff/Stahl/ 
Woywode 1998; Steil/Wolf 1999). Needless to say, these studies are ignored. 
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Of course, it would have been also a good idea to relate the results to studies 
showing less favourable effects of works councils. Addison and Teixeira (2006) find 
no significant relationship between works councils and establishment closures.6 In 
contrast, a previous study by Addison, Bellman and Kölling (2004) found a signifi-
cantly negative association. Addison, Bellman and Kölling also found that works 
council incidence interacts with collective bargaining coverage while Addison and 
Teixeira fail to find a significant interaction effect in their survivor regressions. Addi-
son and Teixeira (2006, 2008) make not the slightest attempt to reconcile the conflict-
ing findings. One might imagine that they would point again to different sample sizes. 
But this does not help. Either the works council has an influence on closures or it has 
no influence on closures. 
Addison and Teixeira’s line of reasoning is evocative of Paul Feyerabend’s (1975) 
“Anything Goes.” Yet, most readers will object to this epistemological anarchism. 
6.  A reminder on scientific style 
Addison and Teixeira (2008) complain that my study is “a characteristically combative 
treatment.” However, science is competition of the best ideas and analyses. And even 
if this competition is sometimes very hard, there is nothing wrong as long as compet-
ing researchers follow the rules of science and fairness. One basic rule is to avoid the 
ad hominem fallacy. Yet, Addison and Teixeira come up with personal attacks. They 
accuse me that I unreservedly view works councils through rose-tinted lenses. Obvi-
ously the authors want to suggest that I am not able to provide an objective study. 
Hence, they conclude that I am eager to be led astray. They go even further and im-
plicitly suggest that I view both workplace codetermination and board-level codeter-
mination through rose-tinted lenses: 
“First of all, he appears to be astonished that one can obtain such negative results on the 
basis of the wider works council literature that points to “neutral-to-positive effects of 
codetermination on economic outcomes” (he is presumably referring to workplace code-
termination rather than board membership; otherwise, we feel entitled to claim that he 
would find the extant empirical literature even harder to bear [e.g. Gorton/Schmid 
2004]).”
Yet, in their keen attempt to discredit my study, Addison and Teixeira are even not 
able to provide a correct citation of what I wrote. The relevant sentence in the English 
abstract of my paper is: 
“Recent econometric studies show a neutral-to-positive effect of workplace codetermina-
tion on economic outcomes.” 
                                                          
6 Addison and Texeira (2008) claim that Jirjahn (2008b) relies on the results of their test 
procedure. However, in that unpublished paper, I examine a potential panel attrition bias 
and not a survivor bias. Interestingly, the authors never asked me to send them my un-
published work. Perhaps they downloaded the paper from a conference homepage. 
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Obviously, here we have a further delicate “error of omission” on Addison and 
Teixeira’s side. They omitted the crucial word “workplace.”7 Addison and Teixeira 
provide also misleading indirect citations. To give an example: 
“Second of all, he concludes with some results of an unpublished study of his (Jirjahn 
2008b) to the effect that works councils actually increase employment once one allows for 
the endogeneity of the institution. Frankly, most observers will view this as a more aston-
ishing claim. Less adversarially put, it is incumbent upon him to establish the point using 
the present dataset or at least to emphasize that the results are from a study covering a 
different dataset, a different sector (manufacturing) and time interval (1994-1997), and to 
acknowledge the well-known difficulty of accounting for the endogeneity of the institu-
tion accentuated in this temporal frame.” 
This is a caricature of what I wrote. In the concluding section of my study, I point to 
an important limitation of my analysis (a limitation shared with Addison and Teixeira’s 
treatment). The study does not take into account the potential endogeneity of works 
councils. I propose that using the IAB Establishment Panel to investigate the issue of 
endogeneity stands as important future research. To motivate this proposal, I refer to 
my unpublished work (Jirjahn 2008b) and stress that this work is based on the well-
known Hannover Firm Panel. 
7.  The issue of endogeneity 
As Addison and Teixeira appear to criticize my unpublished work, it may be useful to 
clarify key results. I find no relationship between works councils and employment 
growth in OLS regressions and a positive relationship when the endogeneity of works 
councils is taken into account. OLS appears to yield downward biased estimates of the 
growth effect of works councils. In my study, there are unobserved factors positively 
influencing the incidence of a works council and negatively influencing employment 
growth. This supports the hypothesis that workers are more likely to be interested in 
work councils when the establishment is facing (financial) pressure. This would seem 
to run counter to Addison and Texeira’s beliefs. Yet, science is not a matter of beliefs. 
International studies taking the endogeneity of worker representation into account 
point into a similar direction (Machin/Wadhwani 1991; Bryson/Dale-Olson 2008). 
Moreover, cross-country studies indicate that cooperative and trustful industrial rela-
tions play a crucial role in employment growth (Blanchard/Phillipon 2006; Feldmann 
2006). Addison and Teixeira criticize my study for being restricted to manufacturing 
establishments in one federal state of Germany. Yet, this clearly helps to avoid a bias 
due to heterogeneity across industries and regions. Probably it would be a good idea 
                                                          
7 Clearly, even some studies on works councils find negative effects of workplace codeter-
mination. Addison, Bellmann and Kölling (2004) provide an example. Yet, all in all, the 
extant recent literature obtains neutral-to-positive effects of workplace codetermination 
on economic outcomes. I recommend Addison and Teixeira to read the more recent sur-
veys by Jirjahn (2005, 2006) and Frick (2008). I recommend them to carefully check if my 
surveys reflect an unreserved view through rose-tinted lenses. The literature on board-
level codetermination appears to be rather inconclusive. But I recommend Addison and 
Teixeira to consider also the recent studies by FitzRoy and Kraft (2005) and Renaud 
(2007).
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for future research to perform separate estimates also with the IAB Establishment 
Panel. 
8.  Concluding remarks 
Addison and Teixeira end their rejoinder with a useful reminder. I feel obliged to 
reciprocate with some useful recommendations. It seems that the authors invent a 
new academic quiz show called “What’s Right And What’s Wrong With Our Paper?” Such 
a quiz show is obviously no good idea. I also do not think that we should adopt a 
rhetorical style of writing that obscures the basic issues. I strongly encourage the 
authors to return to a sound scientific discussion. Addison and Teixeira are certainly 
right with their conclusion that more work is required of all of us to examine the ef-
fects of works councils. In this sense, I look forward to our future scientific exchange. 
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